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Global Futures and Government Towns:
Phosphates and the Production of Western
Sahara as a Space of Contention
Mark Drury
City University of New York,
557 Franklin Avenue #3, Brooklyn, NY 11238 U.S.A.
The study of natural resources lends itself to theorizing the politics of nature and
the politics of time. The space of Western Sahara, where both remain highly
contested, provides an opportunity to consider the ramifications of resources in
political conflict at different historical moments. Drawing from environmental
histories of North Africa and the Sahara, as well as the anthropology of time, the
author focuses on two historical moments. The first, from 1945 to 1976, concerns
the discovery of phosphate deposits during the Spanish colonial period and the
implications of this discovery for political authority in the Sahara more broadly.
The second, contemporary moment is characterized by intensifying interest in plotting the future use and reserves of phosphates, with potential implications for the
political futures of Western Sahara. These two moments are considered in three
parts: the first situates the discovery of phosphates in Western Sahara within the
regional process of decolonization; the second considers the configuration and
reconfiguration of an urban space, Laâyoune, during these two moments of phosphate production; and the third discusses the contemporary dynamics of determining the future of phosphates in the present.
Keywords: decolonization, environmental imaginary, natural resource, phosphate,
resource-making project, crisis, Western Sahara, El Aaiún/ Laâyoune
L’étude des ressources naturelles permet de théoriser les politiques de la nature et de
la temporalité. Dans l’espace du Sahara occidental elles sont toutes les deux très
contestées et permettent alors de saisir la place des ressources durant les différentes
phases d’un conflit politique. En se basant sur les trajectoires environnementales de
l’Afrique du Nord et du Sahara, ainsi que sur des anthropologies de la temporalité,
l’auteur cible deux périodes historiques. La première, qui s’étend de 1945 à 1976,
concerne la découverte de gisements de phosphates pendant la période coloniale espagnole et ses implications pour l’autorité politique au Sahara au sens large. La
seconde concerne la période contemporaine ; elle est caractérisée par un intérêt accru
pour la planification des utilisations ultérieures des réserves de phosphates, et de leurs
conséquences pour le futur politique du Sahara occidental. Ces deux périodes sont
analysées en trois parties : la première positionne la découverte des phosphates du
Sahara occidental dans le processus régional de décolonisation ; la seconde examine
la configuration et la reconfiguration de l’espace urbain de Laâyoune pendant ces
deux périodes de production de phosphate ; et enfin la troisième cerne les dynamiques
contemporaines déterminant le futur des phosphates.
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The geopolitical space of Western Sahara, carved out of the north-west
coast of Africa and allocated to Spain during the Berlin Conference of
1884, is currently defined as a non-self-governing territory, its legal and
political status the subject of an ongoing dispute. The broad outlines of
this dispute have remained largely unchanged since the Spanish withdrawal in 1976: Morocco has claimed—and, since the 1990s, effectively
occupied—the region of Western Sahara, but lacks international legitimacy; Sahrawi nationalists, led by a group known as Polisario,1 maintain
a nation-in-exile in UN-run refugee camps on Algerian territory; a
Sahrawi resistance movement within Moroccan-occupied territory
persists; and the United Nations remains peacekeeping steward to a
stalled process of decolonization that has now lasted for more than three
decades. From colonialism to international law to armed combat to the
definition of Sahrawi identity itself, the history of Western Sahara is
marked by a shifting locus of conflict.
The presence of natural resources has constituted yet another terrain
of struggle, as phosphates, fishing rights, or the prospect of oil have
become prominent at various points in the history of the conflict, both
before and during decolonization. As Akbarali Thobhani (2002)2 illustrates, however, the significance of these resources remains the subject of
debate:
Some argue that Morocco took over Western Sahara and is determined to hold
onto the territory because of its mineral and fishing resources. This author is
among those who believed this to be the case. However, after completing this
study, I no longer share this opinion. It is the author’s view that Morocco would
have taken over the territory even without these resources. The power of the
ideology of “Greater Morocco” or the recuperation of perceived lost territory
was just too intense (Thobhani 2002, 260).

From one perspective, the presence of resources fails to explain
Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara; from another, mineral and
fishing resources constitute the underlying cause of territorial conflict.
Based on a material–ideational dichotomy, this framework separates the
political from the economic and the ideological from the material in an
attempt to identify the primacy of one motivating force over another.
This dichotomy shapes studies concerned not only with the origins of
the conflict but with its evolution over time. Stephen Zunes and Jacob
Mundy provide a more nuanced perspective, without disregarding the
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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role of natural resources—in this case, phosphates—at different points in
time: “Although phosphates do not sufficiently explain Morocco’s desire
to seize Spanish Sahara, they now provide Morocco with ample motivation to hold on to it” (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 35). In this way, they introduce a question of temporality: When do certain natural resources
become important in the Western Sahara dispute, and what might that tell
us about the shifting terrain of struggle? Despite this important distinction, Zunes and Mundy remain embedded in an analytical framework of
motivation and causality, ultimately privileging nationalist ideology over
material resources in order to explain the conflict’s intractability:
“Although economic motivations have changed over time, ideational and
political rationale have remained constant” (Zunes and Mundy 2010, 35).
In separating the territoriality of resources from the ideology of nationalism, the works of Thobhani and of Zunes and Mundy reproduce a
historiography of Western Sahara shaped by this material–ideational
dichotomy:
Should the origins and continuation of the conflict be explained in terms of
nationalist ideology (Zunes and Mundy 2010; Damis 1983; Thobhani 2002) or
in terms of the struggle to control material resources (Shelley 2004; Thompson
and Adloff 1980; Zoubir 1998)?3

As a point of departure, this false choice creates two restrictions.
First, the choice between resources and nationalism naturalizes a certain
scale of analysis: material resources either are or are not the primary
factor motivating nation-state actors. While an analysis of Morocco,
Algeria, or Polisario as nation-state (or, in the case of Polisario, nationstate-like) actors informs certain aspects of the conflict, focusing exclusively on this scale risks overlooking a variety of other dynamics involved
in producing Western Sahara as a space of contention. Why, after all,
begin with nation-state actors to understand a geopolitical space that
defies resolution into a territorial nation-state? Beginning with the
processes surrounding resource production, on the other hand, makes
scale itself a matter of analysis. Fernando Coronil’s study of oil production in Venezuela is instructive in this regard:
Since what is socially significant in the case of natural resources is how the material properties of these resources are made to matter by the network of social
relations woven around them, this focus should lead to an examination of the
spatial structures and political units produced in this process of producing and
distributing wealth (Coronil 1997, 41).

Rather than isolating the resource as an independent variable in the
calculus of nation-state politics, Coronil’s social geography provides an
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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important framework for directing our attention toward the political
configurations produced by and mediating the effects of a given resource,
from the global division of nature to the social spaces that form around
sites of resource extraction.
Drawing on the literature of global political economy, this article
examines how a specific resource, phosphate rock, has influenced the
production of Western Sahara as a space of contention. In focusing on
the specific qualities of phosphate production, I am not suggesting that
the presence of phosphates necessarily makes the territory of Western
Sahara an object of struggle. Nor do I focus on phosphates in order to
suggest that this mineral, over and above other resources, has been particularly decisive in prolonging the conflict. Given the relationship between
phosphate rock (which is used in producing commercial fertilizer) and
agriculture, this particular resource is, not unlike oil, tied to an energy
regime that is global in scope. As a result, situating resource-making
within the global politics of nature helps to illustrate the intersection of
different resources with a variety of political formations, including their
integration into global regimes of governance (Peet, Robbins, and Watts
2011). Considering this resource as a set of relations configured over time,
rather than strictly as the material object of territorial struggle, also
provides an opportunity to rethink the political practices and events
enabled by a given resource (Mitchell 2011). And, finally, attending to the
particular history associated with the regional landscape from which the
resource is extracted—in this case, the Sahara—helps to understand the
“environmental imaginaries” that mediate between changing energy
regimes and the political projects they engender (Davis and Burke 2011).
The second restriction created by the material–ideational dichotomy
concerns the processes through which natural resources become politically significant. The conventional geopolitical approach shaping the
study of Western Sahara implicitly assumes that resources constitute
latent wealth that is both constantly present and presently scarce, and
therefore the object of endless struggle. Whether phosphate rock,
cephalopods, or petroleum prospects, this perspective reduces natural
resources to an unchanging, ready-made form—the commodity. But, as
Elizabeth Emma Ferry and Mandana Limbert point out, resources do
not exist ontologically prior to the historical, social, and political
processes that produce them as such. Rather than treating the resource as
an already formed commodity, Ferry and Limbert suggest that “resourcemaking projects” entail a variety of different temporal processes (Ferry
and Limbert 2008, 15). As these processes intersect with different collectivities’ expectations and uncertainties about historical change, these
resources become associated with a certain temporal sensibility (Limbert
2010). As an anthropology of resources and time, this approach draws
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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our attention both to the moments in resource-making when a given
resource becomes politically significant and to the historical moments
when this occurs.
Drawing from environmental histories of North Africa and the
Sahara, social geography, science and technology studies, and the anthropology of time, I will focus on two historical moments. The first moment,
from 1945 to 1976, concerns the discovery of phosphate deposits during
Spanish colonialism and the implications of this discovery for political
authority in the Sahara more broadly. The second, contemporary
moment is characterized by intensifying interest in plotting the future use
and reserves of phosphates, with potential implications for the political
futures of Western Sahara. These two moments are considered in three
parts: the first situates the discovery of phosphates in Western Sahara
within the regional process of decolonization; the second considers the
configuration and reconfiguration of an urban space, Laâyoune, during
these two moments of phosphate production; and the third discusses the
contemporary dynamics of determining the future of phosphates in the
present.
Part I: Colonialism and the Transformation of Political Authority
While Spanish Sahara had been under colonial rule since 1884, Spain’s
presence well into the 1930s consisted almost entirely of a handful of
coastal military garrisons engaged in limited interactions with fishing
groups along the coast. In this sense, the nomadic and pastoral groups
traversing the desert landscape were only nominally under colonial rule
(Rézette 1975). From the late 1940s onward, however, when one of the
world’s largest phosphate deposits was discovered at Bukra’, some 110 km
inland, the locus of Spanish colonial rule in the Sahara shifted away from
the coast. The construction of the Bukra’ mine marked a period from the
end of World War II until the end of Spanish colonialism in which “the
coast has been replaced, as the zone of conflict, by the inland boundary”
(Mercer 1976, 15). At the centre of this contested zone, Bukra’ produced
not only phosphate rock but a nearby city, Laâyoune, that housed both an
expanded colonial administration and a growing Sahrawi4 nationalist
movement.
This trajectory is captured in a condensed manner in the chapter title
“Minerals and Social Change,” from Tony Hodges’ authoritative history
of Western Sahara. Hodges (1983, 130) suggests that out of the Bukra’
mine “a Sahrawi working class was being born” and that from this
inchoate social formation, a nationalist movement developed. Rightly,
then, the trajectory from the discovery of phosphates in the late 1940s to
the opening of the Bukra’ mine in 1972 has been connected to tremendous
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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transformations in the region. The connection between phosphates,
modernization, decolonization, and nationalism, however, may not be
quite as linear as Hodges’ history suggests. Samir Amin (1994, 17) treats
the post–World War II period as a cycle between the demise of European
imperial capitalism and the consolidation of neo-liberal global capitalism
when alternative political projects were possible in the Third World.
Building on Amin’s insight, Gary Wilder (2012; in review) provides an
understanding of decolonization as not simply the transfer of power from
the colonizer to the colonized but a moment of restructuring when a
number of different political futures seemed possible. From this perspective, the nation-state form based on rigid territorial sovereignty was not
the only possible outcome of decolonization, even if significant pressures
may have structured the end result of this process.
The period between the discovery of phosphate and the Spanish
withdrawal from the region, 1945–1976, includes the opening of the
Bukra’ mine in 1972 and corresponds with Amin and Wilder’s moment of
restructuring. In what follows, I suggest that phosphate mining in Spanish
Sahara might be better understood by situating its effects within a
regional context of decolonization of the Sahara that was quite fluid.
Certainly, the introduction or intensification of industrial mining during
this period entailed infrastructural investments that rapidly integrated the
region into global capitalism. But post–World War II interest in regional
mineral and petrochemical wealth also contributed to shifting political
boundaries and increasingly indeterminate political units as capital
investments in the Sahara intensified. Consequently, the political units
and social spaces produced by mineral wealth during Spanish colonialism
are part of a broader intersection between extractive industries in the
Sahara and decolonization across the region (Trumbull 2011).
In common with the historicization of many natural resources,5 the
history of phosphates in the Sahara typically begins with an account of
discovery. Discovery is constituted not only as a starting point in Western
Sahara’s transition to modernity but as an event saturated in contingency.
This is the origin story of phosphates in Western Sahara: in 1945, a
Spanish geologist named Manuel Alia Medina collected samples from the
flat, hardpack desert hammada of what was then Spain’s colony.
According to one account, Medina originally intended to use the samples
to date the sediments and rock formations, until, subsequently, “it
occurred to him to test the specimens for phosphate content” (Mercer
1976, 184). When lab results yielded extraordinarily high phosphate
levels, Medina’s survey became the point of convergence for colonial
expansion, capital investment, and expert knowledge. The emphasis on
discovery supposedly isolates the moment of contingency when a natural
resource is made to matter by chance: “since the late fifties, Western
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Sahara had experienced belated but rapid changes, due to the sudden
awakening of interest in its mineral resources” (Hodges 1983, 151). But
why did the “sudden awakening” in Western Sahara’s minerals come
about when it did? The contingent nature of discovery, and its emphasis
on individual decisions, obscures what could be broader, more structural
processes at work in making natural resources matter at different points
in time.
Colonial interest in developing the Sahara predated World War II, as
the desert’s geography gave rise to numerous military campaigns, development plans, and exploratory travel accounts in both Spanish Sahara,
on the Atlantic coast, and French Algerian Sahara, to the east. Imagined
in terms of both untapped wealth and a uniformly unforgiving natural
environment, 19th-century schemes for the Sahara varied widely, but were
consistently utopian (Brower 2009). Fascinating and disturbing as these
schemes were, George Trumbull (2011, 88) points out that French colonial planning for the Sahara “operated as much at the level of the spectral
as the speculative.” Late-19th-century capitalist ventures along the northwest coast of Africa that predate Spanish colonial rule help to illustrate
this point. In an effort to tap into trans-Saharan trade and circumvent
French control over North African ports, the Scotsman Donald
Mackenzie established a trading station where the African coast
approaches the Canary Islands at what is now Tarfaya, Morocco (then
known as Cape Juby). Mackenzie’s North West African Company was
successful enough, from 1880 until its liquidation in 1896, to concern
imperial competitors, including the French, whose ambitions for control
over Morocco were intensifying. Nonetheless, this London-based corporation failed to fulfil the broader ambitions outlined in its charter, which
included the aim “to obtain grants or concessions for the opening up and
making, and to open up and make, or cause to be made, a road or roads,
or a canal or canals from Cape Juby aforesaid or its neighborhood into
the interior of Africa” (Mackenzie 1880, n.p.). Mackenzie’s mercantile
venture exemplifies earlier colonial imaginaries of the Sahara as a space
to be transected, rather than a source of wealth in itself.
If these 19th- and early-20th-century projects failed to connect with
circuits of capital to effectively transform the social geography of the
region, their entanglement with colonial rule helped to continually
produce new administrative units and shifting political boundaries. The
baroque history of French border making in the Sahara during Algerian
and Moroccan colonialism illustrates this point particularly well. Before
Morocco became a French Protectorate in 1912, the French Algerian
border was left largely undefined, frequently measuring administrative
control in anthropological (i.e., tribal) rather than geographic terms.
In 1930, with Algeria and Morocco both under French control but
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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administered through separate regimes,6 the French government established the Confins Algéro-Marocain (CAM) in order to facilitate joint
military action, respond effectively to anti-colonial resistance, and
control transportation routes (Beslay 1993). With the military problem
coordinated, CAM continued shifting administrative units between
French Algerian colonial administration and the Moroccan protectorate
well into the 1940s.
The 1950s, however, marked a turning point in French administration
of the Sahara, characterized by a renewed need for border clarification:
In the late 1940s extensive mineral prospecting began in the CAM. In 1952–53
manganese was found in large quantities on the southern edge of the Hammada
of the Guir and in 1953 huge iron deposits were discovered at Gara Djebilet,
near Tindouf. In January 1954 plans were made for oil exploration near Tindouf
… and so, in order to assure French access to minerals in the Saharan border
regions, the protectorate authorities decided to shift Morocco’s “presumed”
southern border northward in 1953 to what came to be known as the “Trinquet
Line” (Hodges 1983, n. 29).

Between mining and oil prospects and burgeoning independence
movements in Morocco and Algeria, French efforts to retain some control
over the Sahara took on greater desperation, and grandeur, generating a
national debate that lasted throughout the decade. Couched in terms of
“fraternité” (Belime 1951) and concern for Saharan peoples as national
minorities, as well as a conception of the Sahara as an empty space with
untapped resources (Boilley 1993, 221, 230), the debate focused on two
options: either a unified territorial entity under French control—concepts
included l’Afrique saharienne française and Territoire national du
Sahara—or a deterritorialized zone for economic investment (Boilley
1993, 218). The discovery of oil in the Algerian Sahara in 1956 led to the
creation the following year of the Organisation commune des régions
sahariennes (OCRS), a kind of “transcolonial” administrative region
forged out of the contiguous areas of the Sahara under French control,
which decolonizing nation-states could join (Kouzmine et al. 2009, 671).
The OCRS dissolved following Algerian independence in 1962, having
produced very little of substance during its existence (Boilley 1993, 230;
Kouzmine et al. 2009, 674).7 Despite its brief and ultimately unconsequential existence, the debates in France that led to OCRS illustrate how
an “environmental imaginary” (Davis and Burke 2011) of the Sahara as
an empty space with untapped resources generated a variety of political
projects at a historically specific moment, such that the region became
“the site of empire’s final interventions” (Trumbull 2011, 106).
French designs on the Sahara leading up to and during decolonizaThe Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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tion remain similar to 19th-century utopian schemes such as Donald
Mackenzie’s in at least two respects: they were never realized, and they
depended upon a conception of the Sahara as an unpopulated expanse of
potential wealth. There was, however, a qualitative shift in European
colonial environmental imaginaries of the Sahara after World War II, as
we see in Hodges’ (1983) description of mineral prospecting in the late
1940s. Whereas an effort to tap into trade routes (trans-Saharan) or populations (as a latent workforce) generally oriented 19th-century imaginaries of the Sahara, post–World War II development of the Sahara
envisioned the territory itself as a store of wealth. With this environmental imaginary in place, the imperative for carefully demarcated
borders developed in tension with French attempts to construct new
administrative units that would encompass the Sahara in its entirety. In
the process, political authority of the Sahara shifted decisively from a
relation between people to control over territory, understood in terms of
abstract (and, increasingly, valuable) space. The resulting institutionalized border ambiguity is important for understanding why territorial
sovereignty remains highly contested as a basis of political authority in
Western Sahara and across the region (Joffé 1987, 2010).
For vast regions of Spanish Sahara that were only nominally under
colonial rule well into the 20th century, colonial presence in the Sahara
was becoming less spectral as speculative capital investments in the region
intensified. Colonial discourses imagining the Sahara as a store of wealth
connected with circuits of capital to produce significant transformations
to the social geography of the region after World War II. With an influx
of capital occurring at the precise moment when colonial sovereignty was
on the wane, social transformations were taking place in the Sahara
amidst tremendous upheaval in the basis of political authority. If, as
Amin (1994) and Wilder (2012) suggest, decolonization was a moment of
political economic restructuring more generally, then the decolonization
of the Sahara produced a particularly fluid and contested political space.
This radical indeterminacy was reflected, at least in part, in the political
significance attributed to minerals such as phosphates in Spanish Sahara,
and in uncertainty over the political and social spaces produced by these
extractive industries.
The “Government Town”
The Saharauis cheer themselves through life with a saying:
“What does it matter if the way is long, provided there is a well
at the end.” But for many it is a mine that awaits them
(Mercer 1976, 184).
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Though the Spanish investment in the Bukra’ phosphate mine took place
in the midst of tremendous political transformation, it had very real
effects in increasing the presence of Spanish colonialism through the
expansion of two sets of infrastructures. The first, built with financing
from French, German, and American companies as well as from the
Spanish state, the colonial mining agency Empresa Nacional Minera del
Sáhara SA (EMINSA), provided the equipment for extracting, transporting, and shipping phosphates from the inland deposit of Bukra’.
Excavation machinery at the open-pit mine included excavators and
trucks. On the coast, a desalination plant was built to clean the phosphate
rock, as well as warehouses for storage and a jetty for loading the mineral
onto ships. To link the mine with the port, a conveyor belt was also built—
reportedly the longest in the world, at 97 km—which transported excavated phosphate from Bukra’ to the coast (Mercer 1976, 186; Hodges
1983, 126–27).
The second infrastructure might be thought of as the human infrastructure tied to the social spaces that developed around the Bukra’ mine.
One of the most useful analytic tools for understanding how extractive
industries produce and transform social space is a spatial structure often
characteristic of mineral or petrochemical extraction: the company town.
The company town is distinguished by the fact that it is exclusively owned
by a single concern and that, as a result, its urban space operates entirely
according to a single rationality of serving the mine. As Kaveh Ehsani
(2003) points out in an essay on Iranian cities built in the mid-20th
century by the Anglo Persian Oil Company, the company town in fact
follows two principles that can be seen as both contradictory and complementary. The first, fairly evident, principle involves worker housing sufficient to ensure the social reproduction, and also the social assimilation, of
the labour force. The second principle requires the control and domination of a subjugated people (Ehsani 2003, 391–2), often through different
“technologies of hierarchy” that separate populations according to
housing and hiring practices (Vitalis 2007, 269).
The colonial administration in Spanish Sahara applied one of these
“technologies of hierarchy” in hiring Sahrawis only for unskilled labour
at the Bukra’ mine, but, like most extractive industries, Bukra’ depended
on a relatively small labour force to remain operative. Upon opening, the
mine employed some 2 620 individuals, the majority of whom were
Spanish labourers from the nearby Canary Islands (Hodges 1983, 130).
Given that worker housing at the Bukra’ site was modest, and remains so
today, it would be misleading to assume that the labour conditions of the
mine constituted the locus of anti-colonial struggle. Phosphate mining
was, of course, generative of broader social and political transformations
in Spanish Sahara, but very few of these changes took place within a
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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classic mining camp or company town.
Rather, an expanded urban and bureaucratic infrastructure accompanying the Bukra’ installation produced a range of new behaviours and
ways of living that can be traced in two ways: to changes in anti-colonial
resistance, and to the expansion of Laâyoune, a settlement some 110 km
north of the mine that became the colony’s administrative capital. In the
late 1950s, when Morocco had decolonized and Algeria was waging a war
for independence from France, many Sahrawis engaged in struggle with
colonial forces through the Harakat at-Tahrir, or Liberation Army.
Thousands of Sahrawis were involved in this movement, which was sponsored—but not entirely controlled—by the Moroccan government and
carried out guerrilla attacks against French and Spanish colonialism in
southern Morocco, Spanish Sahara, the Algerian Sahara, and northern
Mauritania between 1956 and 1958. Following the movement’s ultimate
defeat by a joint French–Spanish counterinsurgency, an estimated 12 000
Sahrawis ended up settling in southern Morocco, northern Mauritania,
or south-west Algeria; the number grew to 50 000 over the next decade
(Mercer 1976, 223; Hodges 1983, 150). What distinguished this movement was that it was broadly anti-colonial without necessarily being
nationalist. With the Bukra’ phosphate mine and the accompanying
expansion of Spanish colonial rule to Laâyoune during the next decade
and a half, Sahrawi anti-colonial struggle became both more localized
and explicitly nationalist.8 The rapidly expanding administrative centre of
Laâyoune was the focal point of this struggle; the first protest of its kind
took place in a public square in the city in 1970, and protests intensified
until Spain withdrew from the colony in 1976 (Zunes and Mundy 2010,
103; Thobhani 2002, 45–50).
This shift in the locus of political struggle in Spanish Sahara occurred
along with the growth of Laâyoune as an administrative capital. As many
Sahrawis left a fully pastoral or nomadic way of life during the late 1960s
and early 1970s, thanks to the confluence of expanded urban infrastructure, colonial administration wage labour, and an extended drought,
Laâyoune became a rapidly expanding urban centre:
El-Ayoun, where there had been little more than a military post and a few
khaimat and shacks in the fifties, was gradually converted into a real town, with
a population of over 40,000, one-third Spanish, by 1974 (Hodges 1983, 130).

Though its growth was undoubtedly an effect of phosphate mining,
Laâyoune was not so much a company town as an outgrowth of the
expanded colonial infrastructure and administration built to accompany
a newfound investment in the control of population and territory. In this
sense, phosphate mining generated, or at least served to legitimate, the
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)
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construction of an urban infrastructure meant to transform the social
relations of a much broader swath of Sahrawis than those involved in
mine work alone. In doing so, the paradigmatic social and political space
in the Sahara was less a “company town” than a “government town,” with
all the infrastructure in place not simply to socialize Sahrawis into wage
labour but to socialize them into serving as subjects of the Spanish
Sahara.
As mentioned above, certain defining elements of the dispute over
Western Sahara have remained in place since Spain’s withdrawal from the
region in 1976. This is not to say, however, that the social geography of the
region has remained unchanged since the end of Spanish colonialism.
Since the construction of berms in 1987 fortified its territorial gains in a
war with Polisario, Morocco has effectively occupied most of the former
Spanish colony. This status quo has been reinforced by the UN ceasefire
established in 1991. Despite the fact that Western Sahara’s sovereignty
remains unresolved, the ceasefire conditions have made it feasible for
Morocco to invest in regional development, contributing to a new phase
of transformation in the social geography of the region, some 30 years
after Spanish colonialism (Thobhani 2002). Expanded government
administration and incentives for moving to the area have substantially
increased the region’s population, while investments in fishing and phosphates serve to absorb a reserve pool of labour (known as dakhilis,
coming from Morocco’s “interior”) drawn to work in Morocco’s
“southern provinces” while sending remittances to the country’s interior
(Mundy 2012).
In addition to the economic transformations and demographic
growth—part of the transformation or even origination of several cities
across Western Sahara over the past two decades—Laâyoune, in particular,
has been the site of the proliferation of governing administrations. In 1991,
the United Nations established its Western Sahara mission headquarters in
Laâyoune to maintain the ceasefire and carry out a referendum.
Meanwhile, Morocco has tried to integrate the part of the region it controls
into the rest of the country, in part by providing housing, water, and sometimes employment at the level of local government. As the outbreak of
violent confrontations between Sahrawis and dakhilis in Laâyoune in 2010
attests, the distribution of these services for political ends—housing and
jobs in particular—has become an important facet of everyday life in
Laâyoune and, increasingly, of the conflict itself (Bennani 2010). Just as the
Bukra’ mine was essential to the establishment of Laâyoune, the ongoing
exploitation of phosphates and other natural resources in the region9 has
sustained the expansion of urban centres in Western Sahara since the UN
ceasefire. Rather than focusing on the small company town that surrounds
the mine itself, however, I suggest that Laâyoune is largely constituted by
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the kind of governmental infrastructure that has accompanied resourcemaking projects during two different moments of Western Sahara’s decolonization. From moving the Spanish colonial apparatus inland while
establishing the mine to the dual presence of Moroccan and UN administrations since 1991, a “surfeit of government” (Feldman 2008, 1) remains a
defining feature of Laâyoune, and of the unresolved process of decolonization in Western Sahara more generally.
Part II: Global Political Futures: Remaking Phosphate Reserves
As the example of Laâyoune helps to illustrate, phosphates emerge as a
significant factor in transforming the social geography of Western Sahara
at what might be thought of as two different moments of decolonization:
post–World War II colonial Spanish Sahara, and again since 1991 under
a Moroccan occupation that coexists with the UN-administered ceasefire.
The conventional geopolitical approach of international relations
provides a useful insight in pointing out the different moments when
phosphates have been lucrative to the entity controlling Western Sahara,
and when they have not. However, the complex political processes at work
in making these things matter in the present moment differ substantially
from the colonial period. From this perspective, the prevailing geopolitical approach that structures the debate surrounding the Western Sahara
conflict provides little insight, since it conceptualizes natural resources as
abstract commodities, the importance of which remains unchanged
across time and space. The rest of this article considers three concepts or
discourses—scarcity, security, and crisis—that influence the contemporary “resource-making project” of phosphates. Specifically, I examine the
different temporalities converging in the contemporary moment (Limbert
2008) through concern over phosphate rock supply following a 700 %
increase in prices from 2007 to 2008 (Elser and Bennett 2011, 30). This
price shock prompted both an expansion in Moroccan phosphate
production10 and broader concern over world supplies of phosphorus.
While the visible effects of these developments on the ground in Western
Sahara may seem negligible, I suggest that the discourses emerging from
this event could have ramifications for the struggle over Western Sahara’s
political future.
Scarcity
One of the primary uses of mined phosphate rock is in fertilizer. Since the
late 19th century, phosphorus has been imported to Europe in various
forms, but with the mid-20th-century “Green Revolution,” in particular,
chemical fertilizer made from phosphate rock has become integral to
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intensive agriculture in many parts of the world. Closely integrated with
agricultural production, phosphate minerals, not unlike oil, are as much
constitutive of the metabolic relationship between humans and nature as
food itself. However, phosphorus is a basic element and one of the essential nutrients that render land arable, so that, unlike oil, there is no
synthetic substitute. Traditionally, phosphorus was often replenished
either by using human waste as fertilizer or through less intensive agricultural practices such as crop rotation. But as phosphate-rock-based chemical fertilizer replaced many of these practices, the cyclical yields of
agricultural production have increasingly been tied to a continuous
supply of phosphate rock (Cordell, Drangert, and White 2009, 293–99).
From an environmental perspective, the 2007–8 price shock has
generated increased concern about the temporal tension between a finite
resource, phosphate rock, and the need for renewable supplies of soil
nutrients, including phosphorus. A number of environmental scientists,
wondering “how humanity became addicted to phosphate rock” (Cordell
et al. 2009, 302), have started research collectives and Web sites around
phosphorus use,11 articulating their concerns over the scarcity of phosphate rock through the concept of “peak phosphorus.” An article from
the journal Ecologist explains this concept and its ramifications:
Suddenly however, it seems the limits are almost upon us. In 2007, physicist
Patrick Déry applied to phosphate rock the same statistical method that has
been used consistently to predict when oilfields will peak. His results suggest
that phosphate production has already peaked. If true, that would be catastrophic news, especially for the less-industrialized world (Kingston 2010, 6–7).

The “peak oil” method assumes that the remaining quantity of a given
resource is known and inelastic. By modelling future demand and
applying these projections to the quantity of resource remaining in
reserve, this method predicts a future tipping point, after which production levels will drop and prices will rise. Following calculations that differ
from those mentioned above, “peak phosphorus” has also been predicted
for 2033 (Cordell et al. 2009, 298).
The “peak” model assumes that a resource’s reserve base is a natural,
and static, fact. As Coronil (1997) explores in his study of oil production
in Venezuela, however, natural resources are products of a number of
political economic processes generative of value, including what is known
as “differential rent.” Differential rent accounts for the varying levels of
productivity among all the sites brought into production in order to
satisfy market demands for a given natural resource. A mine that yields
high-quality phosphate rock requiring low-cost techniques, such as
Bukra’, produces high rents. In order to make the least productive or
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accessible phosphate deposit worth mining, a standard rate of profit must
be set that averages with the most productive or accessible location. And
because rents accrue to the property owner, whether individual, state, or
corporate, the owner can act as a monopoly with the power to maintain
“a reserve price which they typically demand and extract before they
release the resource to others to exploit” (Harvey 2010, 81). This is how
mineral and petrochemical resource prices are generally set.12 While this
reserve price is typically quite low because of the coercive laws of competition, changes in price will affect the quantity or yield of a resource, and
these changes can occur through technological as well as natural means.
In other words, scarcity is not simply a question of how much of a given
resource exists “in nature,” but depends upon a number of political
economic processes that produce nature—and resources—as such.
Morocco’s response to the price shock of 2007–8 illustrates this
point. In 2010, the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC),
an international non-governmental organization13 with headquarters in
Muscle Shoals, Alabama, published a report with aggregated data on
phosphate resources from around the world, the first of its kind since the
end of the Cold War. Based on a revised estimate of world reserves in
phosphate rock, the report concluded that “at current rates of production, phosphate rock reserves to produce fertilizer will be available for
300–400 years” (Van Kauwenbergh 2010, 43). This revision, extending the
horizon for phosphate rock supply into the distant future, was not the
result of a discovery of new deposits. Rather, the authors of the study
projected a new timeline for phosphate rock based on incorporating a
broad swath of previously known deposits into the category of
“reserves”—a revision attributed almost entirely to an increase in
Morocco’s estimated phosphate reserves, from 5.7 to 50 billion tons. As
the report states, “the world reserve of phosphate rock is a dynamic
figure” (Van Kauwenbergh 2010, vii). This dynamism, however, is not
simply the elasticity of supply in response to demand. Morocco’s ten-fold
increase was largely the reclassification of large deposits from “reserve
base”—a category discontinued by U.S. Geological Survey reports in
2009 (U.S. Geological Survey 2010, 119)—to “reserves” (Rosemarin and
International Fertiliser Society 2011, 5). Whereas reserves include only
“recoverable materials,” the reserve base “may encompass those parts of
the resources that have a reasonable potential for becoming economically
available within planning horizons beyond those that assume proven technology and current economics” (U.S. Geological Survey 2010, 194,
Appendix C). In this sense, the adjustment also depends upon semantic
ambiguity and sleight of hand. After all, what constitutes a planning
horizon “beyond those that assume proven technology and current
economics”? In the case of phosphates, as with other resources,14 the
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measurements for these projections currently remain the proprietary
information of resource owners—in this instance the Moroccan national
entity, OCP. But, as I have tried to demonstrate here, the proprietary
nature of this information contributes to the proliferation of planning
horizons; in this sense, these horizons—different global futures, in
essence—might be thought of as the prevailing environmental imaginary
of today.
Security
In addition to extending the timeline for viable phosphate extraction into
the distant future, the adjusted figures from the IFDC report also confirm
that 85 % of the world’s current known phosphate reserves can be found
in Morocco (Morocco News Board 2010). Already one of the three
largest phosphate-mining countries in the world, along with China and
the United States, Morocco was, until recently, the only source for
imported phosphates into the United States (U.S. Geological Survey
2010). Indeed, Morocco’s increased share in the world market coincides
with declining phosphate reserves in the United States (Van
Kauwenbergh 2010, 13). For scholarship concerned, implicitly or otherwise, with security, this makes Morocco’s geopolitical interests and the
accessibility of these enormous reserves an object of concern.
Scholarship expressing concern on this matter ranges in tone from the
technocratic—a call for “broad governance agreements” with Morocco
(Rosemarin and International Fertiliser Society 2011, 6)—to the hyperbolic:
Many of the world’s food producers are in danger of becoming completely
dependent on trade with Morocco, where press reports have emerged of Dubaistyle luxury developments being planned in anticipation of phosphorus windfalls (Elser and Bennett 2011, 31).

A phosphorus supply associated with the near term has generated a
discourse focused on scarcity, while phosphorus supply projected into the
long term has generated a discourse focused on security. And yet the two
discourses and temporalities also intertwined when, following the 2007–8
price spike, U.S. national security concerns addressed the maintenance of
phosphorus supply in the short term:
In May [2011], a workshop sponsored by the US Department of Energy
included phosphorus alongside dysprosium, yttrium and other rare earth
elements of crucial importance to US national security that face potential
supply bottlenecks (Elser and Bennett 2011, 30).
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Similarly, in scholarship concerned with the scarcity of phosphate rock,
the phrases “global food security” and “global phosphorus security” are
frequently used to buttress arguments for alternative models of phosphorus supply.15
Crisis
Indeed, scarcity and security concerns over global phosphate reserves
have a shared historical and conceptual point of departure. Historically,
these concerns derive from the price increase of 2007–8. Conceptually,
both discourses attribute this price shock to a crisis. Understood as an
event resulting from a disequilibrium between supply and demand, a
crisis, in these terms, is an economic problem. It is not my intention here
to critique the conception of capitalist crisis, which recognizes the structural tendencies in capitalism toward over-accumulation and the destruction of capital that follows. Rather, I am following from Mitchell’s
critique of the historicization of the 1973–74 oil crisis:
In the 1973–74 oil crisis, the law of supply and demand was not a fiction, but a
fabrication. It was a precise piece of equipment carefully fabricated by certain
parties to a dispute. To achieve their goals, those participants tried to organise
an event that was assembled and performed in such a way that the laws of
economics might operate (Mitchell 2011, 174).

Whereas Mitchell attributes a certain amount of agency to the international oil industry in fabricating the 1973–74 oil crisis, I am not suggesting
the same kind of strategy with respect to the U.S. fertilizer industry. I
simply want to point out the resources that become available from
defining an event as a crisis, and the discourse and policies that emerge as
effects of this event historicization.
Thus, one discourse claims to identify scarcity as the cause of the
crisis, while the other takes responsibility for protecting against future
events of this nature through improved regimes of governance, or security. Both discourses—again, they are frequently intertwined—attempt to
define the future. If we take a step back from this debate over “peak phosphorus” and revisions to world phosphate reserves, it becomes immediately apparent that the current “resource-making project” surrounding
phosphates concerns its temporality in a manner distinct from the period
of “discovery” during Spanish colonialism. During the post–World War
II moment discussed earlier, the potential associated with minerals in the
Sahara was absolute: either mineral wealth was there or it was not, and
the verification of this potential depended upon the act of discovery. In
the present moment, however, the potential associated with phosphate
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe Vol 16, no 1 (2013)

118

Mark Drury

rock is much more ambiguous and depends upon the planning horizons
used for projecting its future use.16 Are there ramifications for using this
resource in the short or long term? Is its depletion near (33 years) or
distant (300–400 years)? And to what extent is this future finite, or is this
horizon constantly being adjusted?
The association of phosphate production with a crisis in global food
production has had the effect of saturating the immediate future with
gravity and concern:
In 2007–2008, the same pressures that caused the recent global food crisis led to
phosphate rock and fertilizer demand exceeding supply and prices increased by
700% in a 14–month period … the short-term situation can be seen as an indication of what is to come (Cordell et al. 2009, 294).

The notion of crisis as marking “what is to come” echoes Jane Guyer’s
conception of punctuated time. For Guyer, crisis serves as both interruption and omen, marking the potential for imminent transformation
through “signal event moments in near-future time at which the whole
world could change” (Guyer 2007, 417). Crisis marks both a short-term
situation that offers the opportunity to break with the past (potentially
ending humanity’s “addict[ion] to phosphate rock”; Cordell et al. 2009,
302) and the potential for a catastrophic end point should soil nutrients
be depleted once and for all. As one commentator on the food crisis has
written, “Civilization can survive the loss of its oil reserves, but it cannot
survive the loss of its soil reserves” (Brown 2011).
While the affective sense of time associated with phosphates remains
contested, the concerns over scarcity and security overlook the fact that,
for fertilizer manufacturers and the Moroccan state, the price increase in
2007–8 was not a crisis at all. Instead, an event termed a “crisis” has
enabled both Moroccan phosphate mining and U.S. fertilizer manufacturing interests to assemble a new set of political-economic arrangements
that appear to suit both parties quite well. With U.S. phosphate production in decline, American fertilizer manufacturers retain a reliable source
of a crucial ingredient for commercial fertilizer, while the Moroccan state
can expand a pillar of its economy.
Because OCP does not keep separate data on Bukra’ reserves (Chick
2013), it can be difficult to discern the ramifications of this adjustment to
Moroccan reserves for phosphate production in Western Sahara. Even if
the figures have no impact on production at Bukra’, a study of the dispute
in 1983 suggested that “[i]t is more important for Morocco … to deny the
Saharan phosphates to a competitor than to mine them itself ” (Damis
1983, 29). An increase in Morocco’s share of global reserves can only reinforce that dynamic. Unlike 30 years ago, however, the information on
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phosphate reserves has now been aggregated into a global data set and
reproduced through scientific and journalistic discourses. As Gabrielle
Hecht (2012, 211) notes, the process of making data global can be prone
to certain exclusions that, beyond the initial point of erasure, are not
deliberate, but reproduce a certain “scientific ignorance.”17 Both the
IFDC and USGS reports illustrate this point, listing deposits for
“Morocco and Western Sahara” but not for Western Sahara separately
(Van Kauwenbergh 2010, 19, 33, 36, 40, 41; U.S. Geological Survey 2010).
Once figures such as Morocco’s 85 % share of world phosphate reserves
are cited in scholarly and journalistic accounts, Western Sahara has long
since been rendered invisible.18 The global discourses around phosphate
reserves, then, have the effect of erasing Western Sahara as a space and
source of resources, even while events in Laâyoune and elsewhere in the
region increasingly make the conflict visible at an international scale.
Conclusion
The study of natural resources lends itself to theorizing the politics of
nature and the politics of time. And the space of Western Sahara, where
territorial control and political futures remain highly contested, provides an
opportunity to consider the ramifications of resources in political conflict
at different historical moments. Rather than isolating phosphates as a decisive factor either in the origins or in the continuation of the conflict, tracing
the dynamics involved in making phosphate rock a resource helps to highlight how this material has become politically significant at a number of
different sites and scales, including the history of the Western Sahara
conflict; the production of the urban administrative infrastructure of
Laâyoune; and the formation of a number of discourses around the global
future of phosphates in the present. These seemingly disparate political
processes, social spaces, and discursive formations provide some insight
into the changing politics of nature and time at two different moments of
decolonization. Mid-20th-century resources in the Sahara epitomized the
potential to prolong empire amidst a radical indeterminacy in the political
formations of the decolonizing world. In contemporary times, the anxieties
surrounding global phosphate reserves are indicative of the convergence of
nature with time in contemporary environmental imaginaries. Meanwhile,
just as the discovery of phosphates effectively brought Spanish Sahara into
being, interest in the future of phosphates in the present moment serves to
obscure the space of Western Sahara at the level of global scientific
discourse, even as ongoing changes to the region’s social geography
continue to produce conflict in the everyday lives of people living in
Laâyoune and elsewhere in the region.
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Notes
1
2

Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and the Rio de Oro.
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this particular work.
3 This is not presented as a comprehensive review of literature on the topic: I
am not, for example, addressing works in Arabic, French, or Spanish.
However, the works cited here are characteristic of a conventional geopolitical / international relations paradigm that is particularly influential in
English-language literature on Western Sahara.
4 Sahrawi is simply Arabic for a Saharan person (or thing). In a general anthropological sense, it refers to Hassaniya-speaking people throughout southern
Morocco, Mauritania, and the Algerian Sahara. More specifically, Sahrawi
has developed an ethno-nationalist meaning since mid-20th-century decolonization. Polisario, for example, represents the Sahrawi people at the United
Nations (Zunes and Mundy 2010, xxi–xxii, 92–95).
5 Daniel Yergin’s (1991) extensive empirical history of oil, which foregrounds
happenstance and discovery at every turn, exemplifies this narrative
approach.
6 As a Protectorate, the colonial administration in Morocco reported to the
French Ministry of the Colonies but operated with relative autonomy, while
Algeria was administered through the French Ministry of the Interior.
7 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for referring me to these sources on the
history and debates surrounding the establishment of OCRS.
8 Sahrawis successfully undermined the Bukra’ mining operation on multiple
occasions while resisting Spanish colonial rule, by sabotaging “the most
obvious target” (Mercer 1976, 230): the conveyor belt. Bukra’ remained a
pivotal target and strategic point in the armed struggle between Polisario and
Morocco during the 1980s.
9 Fishing off the coast of Western Sahara has been an important resource and
remains an ongoing point of contention in Morocco’s renewal of a fishing
agreement with the European Union.
10 In 2010, Morocco’s Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP) announced plans
to build four new fertilizer units, expand its mining capacity 60 %, and
increase its processing capacity more than four-fold (Ghanmi 2010).
11 See, e.g., GlobalPNetwork (http://globalpnetwork.net), SustainableP
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12

13

14

15

16

(http://sustainablep.asu.edu), and PhosphorusFutures (http://phosphorusfutures.net). These research groups propose phosphorus recovery systems as
a sustainable alternative to phosphate rock mining. Since almost none of the
phosphorus ingested by way of fertilized foods is retained by the body,
proposed solutions focus on recapturing the phosphorus in human waste. As
one article puts it, “A paradigm shift is needed to see human excreta as a
potential resource rather than a waste” (Rosemarin and International
Fertiliser Society 2011, 19). The threat of phosphorus depletion, however,
varies widely. The soils of most large-scale producers have accumulated sufficient levels of phosphorus from sustained use of heavy fertilizers. Smaller
peasant farmers face nutrient depletion more immediately. Rather than
looking at this as a political-economic problem resulting from the uneven
distribution of commercial fertilizer, the sustainability systems approach for
recovering phosphorus suggests targeting peasant farming for this “paradigm shift” in the use of human waste: “That sub-Saharan Africa uses such
low levels of chemical fertiliser … provides an immediate opportunity for the
use of sanitation-based reuse systems” (Rosemarin and International
Fertiliser Society 2011, 15). See Cordell et al. (2009, 2011).
In the case of oil or natural gas, predicting this price has itself become an
industry of sorts that absorbs speculative capital in the form of commodity
futures. Entire consulting practices have developed around forecasting these
prices (see Mason 2007). This is not the case with phosphate mining: “Unlike
many commodities whose price is determined on futures exchanges, phosphate transactions are mostly negotiated directly between producers and
industrial users” (Ghanmi 2010).
“IFDC is a public international organization, governed by an international
board of directors with representation from developed and developing countries. The nonprofit Center is supported by various bilateral and multilateral
aid agencies, private foundations and national governments. IFDC was
established in 1974 in response to the twin crises of food insecurity and rising
energy prices. Parallel crises threaten the world again.” See
http://www.ifdc.org/About.
Timothy Mitchell (2011, 243–46) contrasts the ambiguities surrounding peak
oil with the politics of climate change, based on the difference between access
to accurate measurements: whereas climate change can be measured from
public space, the material for measuring oil reserves remains proprietary and
secret. The IFDC report also notes that basic classifications such as “reserve”
and “resource” vary depending on the phosphate producer (Van
Kauwenbergh 2010, vii).
Specifically, two sources cited elsewhere in this article use the phrase “global
food security” in the article title: Cordell et al. (2009), “The story of phosphorus: Global food security and food for thought”; and Cordell et al.
(2011), “Towards global phosphorus security: A systems framework for
phosphorus recovery and reuse options.”
I thank Mandana Limbert for drawing my attention to the different forms of
potential that can be associated with a given resource at different historical
moments, both in her work (Limbert 2008) and in conversation.
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17 Hecht calls this “a textbook case of what Robert Proctor [2008] calls agnotology: the ‘conscious, unconscious, and structural production of ignorance.”
18 The NGO Western Sahara Resource Watch attempts to highlight the trajectory of Western Sahara resources from source to end user by identifying the
corporations purchasing the material, and have successfully exerted pressure
on certain governments to divest from corporations making these purchases
(see http://www.wsrw.org/).
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